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Abstract: Colleges are increasingly open to partnering with private entities to implement new and 
innovative programs. Community colleges, in particular, may find such partnerships beneficial, 
given that these institutions often lack the necessary resources to invest up-front in programs that 
may yield strong long-term dividends. In this article we report on an examination of a partnership 
between a privately-held firm and six community colleges, which had established honors programs 
with the goal of facilitating students’ transfer to highly selective institutions. Our analysis traces the 
evolution of the partnership and the reasons for its eventual failure, and we offer insights for public 
institutions and privately-held companies wishing to establish similar partnerships.  
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Public-private partnerships represent a fast-growing trend in U.S. higher education (Storms, Miller, 
& Hall, 2017). Through such partnerships private entities typically invest infrastructure or resources 
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designed to increase the scale or efficiency of a college and then reap the resulting revenues (Amey, 
2010; Amey, Eddy, & Ozaki, 2007; Patrinos, Barrera-Osorio, Guáqueta, 2009; Redden, 2018a). To 
the extent that colleges can take advantage of private companies’ economies of scale to provide 
traditional or new services at a lower cost, these partnerships could represent a classic “win-win” 
scenario. However, cross-sector collaborations can be risky: they often bind partners to long-term 
contracts and revenue-sharing agreements and require relationship management that can become 
labor-intensive to the point of unsustainability (Amey et al., 2007; Hunt, 2018; Kim, 2018; Redden, 
2018b; Redden, 2018c). To ensure that a cross-sector collaboration works for both parties, entities 
must carefully select the partner, set clear goals and expectations, and understand differences 
between the two sectors (Amey et al., 2007; Storms et al., 2017). In addition, it is particularly 
important to engage both partners’ key stakeholders and obtain their buy-in beforehand (Hunt, 
2018) in order to avoid partnership failure.  
In the most comprehensive model of partnership development within the postsecondary 
education sector, Amey et al. (2007) drew from a number of frameworks such as negotiated order 
theory, sense-making theory, and the interdisciplinary collaboration framework (Amey & Brown, 
2004; Strauss, 1978; Weick, 1995) to describe why partnerships are formed and sustained across 
time. Amey et al.’s framework includes two stages. First, during the partnership development 
process, each partner may be driven by different motivations which are rooted in their own 
contexts; for example, new state policy mandates, declining enrollments, or community needs could 
all motivate a college to seek a partner. These motivations are often crystallized by a “champion,” 
an institutional agent who believes in the partnership and is willing to spend “political capital” to 
forward the partnership and its goals by leveraging interpersonal connections and exerting social 
influence (Amey, 2010; Bourdieu, 1991). Amey et al. pointed out that it is critical for the champion 
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and other relevant organizational leaders to “frame” the partnership appropriately during the 
development process; to do so, they need to help institutional stakeholders understand the intended 
goals of the partnership and solicit and incorporate feedback regarding the partnership. If the 
developmental process is short-changed—if champions or organizational leaders assume that 
institutional stakeholders understand and agree with the rationale for the collaboration—then the 
partnership “is often not sustained; does not meet the objectives; or results in ill-will, misuse of 
resources, and organizational dysfunction” (p. 12). The second stage emerges during the process 
leading to sustainability when partners begin to see the outcomes of the partnership and how those 
impact, or are impacted by, the changing context. Amey et al. said relatively little about why and 
how many partnerships were not sustained; they noted that partnerships may be dissolved because 
the goals remain unmet or because the context itself changes; overall, however, they concluded that 
“The key to the model, and partnership success, is how the institution and its members frame the 
partnership and how this changes as the partnership continues” (p. 11).  
For this case study we used Amey et al.’s two-stage partnership framework to examine the 
development and dissolution of an academically-focused public-private partnership between a 
private firm, Quad Learning (QL), and six community colleges. In particular, we asked, if the Amey 
et al. framework adequately described the trajectory of the partnership or might the framework need 
expansion. To address this question we first examined the QL partnership development process 
including the context and motivation for the partnership, how champions framed the partnership and 
sought feedback and how other institutional stakeholders framed the partnership. We next examined 
the failure of the process leading to sustainability, including how the outcomes and context of the 
partnership and the related framing shifted across time. 
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The Study 
Setting 
In fall 2012 QL partnered with two community colleges to pilot a selective-admissions, premium-
tuition program dubbed “American Honors” (AH), which was designed to help academically 
talented community college students overcome the challenges inherent in transferring to more 
selective four-year destinations. The cohort-based program included a set of honors courses taught 
by the faculty members at each community college; two support-oriented courses taught by college-
based AH advisors who had been recruited, trained, and employed by QL; and intensive advising 
services. In addition, QL worked to secure articulation and admission agreements for AH students 
with a wide variety of selective transfer destinations. While the premium tuition rate varied across 
community colleges, students were typically charged an additional 50% in tuition or fees in order to 
participate in AH. By fall 2014 the program had expanded to serve 650 students at six community 
colleges and multi-college districts and was aiming to serve 3,000 by fall 2016. During the fall and 
spring of 2016, the authors visited six of QL’s partner community colleges and interviewed 181 
students, faculty members, staff, and key administrators.  The human subjects protocol had been 
approved by the Institutional Review Board at Teachers College, Columbia University 
(Protocol#16-15316-153).  The 2016 site visits resulted in a preliminary brief which summarized 
the program’s student selection process, key program components, and stakeholder impressions 
regarding the program’s potential to improve student success (Jaggars, Grant, Fay, & Farakish, 
2017). At the time stakeholders were generally positive about the program in terms of its potential 
for improving student transfer outcomes. Yet by the close of 2018 QL had dissolved the AH 
program for domestic students, and QL itself was sold to Wellspring International Education in a 
“distress sale” (Wan, 2018). 
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Procedures 
The six sites we visited included a mix of smaller and larger campuses located in large-city, 
suburban, and small-city areas. Four of the colleges already offered at least some honors courses, 
but none offered a cohort-based honors program with dedicated advising. During the 2016 site 
visits, the authors conducted 181 semi-structured one-hour interviews with AH and Non-AH 
students, faculty members, staff, and key administrators. The purpose of these interviews was to 
develop "an understanding by means of conversations" (Kvale, 1996, p. 11) with study participants 
and to explore how they understood and told about "their lived world" as the major stakeholders in 
the AH program (p. 1). With the exception of a few telephone interviews with faculty members who 
had scheduling constraints during our site visits, the 2016 interviews were conducted in person. In 
summer 2018 we also conducted follow-up telephone calls with five key college administrators (one 
at each of five colleges), who had initially been interviewed during the 2016 site visits, in order to 
discuss their college’s reaction to QL’s plans to dissolve the domestic AH program.   
To examine the process of partnership development and dissolution, this article drew from 
all faculty (n = 33) and administrator (n= 37) interviews. We excluded student interviews from this 
analysis because students had little knowledge about or insight into the relationship between QL 
and their college. Administrator and faculty interview protocols included questions about the 
pedagogy of the AH program, course delivery formats, student campus engagement, transfer 
resources, student support services, cost-benefit to the college, and the overall experience of 
partnering with QL. Administrator protocols included more detailed questions and probes about 
costs and benefits to the college, while faculty member protocols included more questions and 
probes about curricular and pedagogical matters. Many “administrators” were also faculty members, 
and they were probed on both business and academic issues. We completed a summary sheet after 
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each interview, recording our observations and initial reflections on the interview data in order to 
capture researchers’ "analytical thinking about data" (Maxwell, 2005, p. 96). The team also 
compiled and emailed a preliminary memo to each college within a few weeks of the site visit to 
that particular college, which summarized interviewers’ observations and reflections about the visit.  
To complement college stakeholders’ impressions regarding the value of the partnership in 
terms of student recruitment and enrollment, the authors also drew from QL’s database of electronic 
student applications to the AH program, which included nearly 12,000 domestic applicants to the 
program at any of the six community colleges or multi-college districts across the program’s fall 
2014 through fall 2016 admission cycles. Applicant records were matched with the National 
Student Clearinghouse, allowing us to track the enrollment behaviors of students who were 
accepted by the AH program but declined to enroll in it. 
Data Analysis 
To organize the vast amount of interview data, the authors designed a coding scheme based on six 
parent codes (interviewee background, general AH program information, honors pedagogy, transfer 
processes, advisement, and campus community/engagement), and 64 sub-codes. For example, the 
“interviewee background” code included sub-codes regarding when or why the interviewee chose to 
enroll or work at that college (“selection of college”), their initial encounters or judgments about 
AH (“initiation into AH”), their relationship to AH-related internal committees and governance 
structures (“honors committee”), their responsibilities or status at the college (“staff 
responsibilities/student status”), and their perceptions of their college in general (“perceptions of 
college”). A given excerpt – defined as the interviewee expressing a full thought, which was 
typically a few lines in length—could be coded with more than one sub-code, if relevant. When 
appropriate, sub-codes were also crossed with an emotional valence code which indicated whether 
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the interviewee articulated “positive” versus “negative” feelings about the issue under discussion. 
Using the qualitative software analysis program Dedoose, the team also coded each individual 
interviewee in terms of stakeholder type (i.e., administrator or faculty members). 
To establish coding reliability, twelve transcripts were initially test-coded by each researcher 
individually and then compared; any coding discrepancies were discussed, resolved, and used to 
refine the final coding scheme. Throughout the coding process each fifth transcript was reviewed by 
another coder to flag any inconsistencies in coding decisions. The researchers then met bi-weekly to 
review any flagged inconsistencies, discuss how to resolve them, and further refine code definitions. 
Coders then reviewed and re-coded sections of previously-coded transcripts, if necessary, so as to 
adhere to new refinements. 
In order to identify excerpts which dealt with the development and dissolution of the 
partnership with QL, we focused on codes dealing with faculty members’ and administrators’ 
perceptions of QL staff, the AH business model, and other aspects of the AH partnership. For 
example, in order to identify excerpts relevant to the partnership development process, the lead 
researcher pulled all administrator and faculty members excerpts coded under “initiation into AH,” 
“honors committee,” or “perceptions of AH,” and read each carefully, discarding those that dealt 
with an interviewee first encountering the program well after it had been established on campus or 
that dealt with perceptions of AH that were unrelated to how the college entered into, or initially 
communicated about, the partnership. This process resulted in 109 excerpts from 41 unique 
respondents which described the development of each college’s relationship with QL. In analyzing 
the data, the authors then used the grounded theory approach (Creswell, 2003; Leedy & Ormrod, 
2001; Robson, 2002; Strauss & Corbin, 1990 and 1998) to conduct a "careful, line-by-line reading 
of the text while looking for processes, actions, assumptions, and consequences" (Ryan & Bernard, 
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2003, p. 275) in order "to identify categories and concepts that emerge[d] from text and [to] link 
these concepts into substantive and formal theories" (Ryan & Bernard, 2003, p. 278). That is, we 
identified concepts regarding the partnership development and dissolution process and determined 
how well or poorly they matched with Amey’s two-stage partnership framework. 
 In addition to the qualitative analyses, we conducted a descriptive analysis of the National 
Student Clearinghouse data in order to understand the competitive business landscape for the 
program.  The focus was on the two- and four-year college destinations of students admitted to AH 
who ultimately did not enroll in the program. 
Findings 
We organized our results according to Amey et al.’s two-stage model of partnership. First, we 
examined the partnership development process including the context and motivation for the QL 
partnership, how college champions framed the partnership and sought feedback and how other 
institutional stakeholders framed the partnership. Second, we examined the failure of the process 
leading to sustainability including how the outcomes, context, and framing of the partnership 
shifted across time, leading to the eventual dissolution of the partnership.  
Context and Motivation for Partnership 
The administrators at all the colleges felt it was important for the institution to develop a robust and 
well-known honors program for four reasons: to provide opportunities for local high-achieving but 
low-income students, to boost the institution’s reputation for strong academics and transfer success, 
to increase enrollments and revenue, and to improve retention and graduation rates for the college in 
general. As one administrator put it, “we wanted a way of attracting a type of student that we knew 
we weren’t getting very much. And by that, I mean a stronger student who probably is more likely 
to finish and complete.”  
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Four of the six colleges already offered at least some honors courses prior to their 
relationship with Quad Learning, and two of these offered enough honors courses to characterize it 
as a fully developed program. However, neither of these institutions had the necessary resources to 
create a coordinated model of wraparound support by packaging its activities within a cohort-based 
honors program with intensive and proactive transfer advising. Accordingly, a partnership with QL 
seemed appealing: QL would provide up-front resources to quickly establish and market a 
wraparound support program that would attract many new and higher-caliber students. To deliver 
the program the community colleges would need only to perform the ordinary business of the 
college (recruiting faculty members to design and teach honors courses and organizing honors 
students admission, registration, financial aid, tuition payment, scheduling, and other administrative 
processes) with a small amount of additional overhead (providing office spaces for AH advisors and 
a small Honors lounge). QL would invest all the up-front costs such as providing financial and 
instructional design assistance to honors faculty members for course development; recruiting, 
training, and paying the salaries of AH advisors; developing relationships and transfer agreements 
with admissions staff at selective universities across the country; and absorbing the cost of some 
AH student and faculty members activities including student orientations and graduation dinners as 
well as an annual faculty members professional development conference. In return for QL’s 
investment, the college would split all revenues from premium-tuition AH enrollees.  
Champions and Their Framing 
At all six colleges, a top administrator first heard about AH and recommended that the college 
consider joining the network. To these champions the motivation for the partnership seemed 
obvious, as detailed above; and thus most institutions shortchanged the process of framing and 
seeking feedback. One college took a “top-down” and “whirlwind” approach to joining the network; 
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four colleges involved a small set of key stakeholders from among faculty members in the decision-
making process; but only one was highly inclusive. The inclusivity of the decision-making process 
was obviously and directly correlated with the faculty members’ interest in the program and their 
initial willingness to teach its courses. Given that only one college was strongly inclusive in its 
decision-making approach, the majority of our faculty interviewees were initially highly resistant to 
the partnership idea. One faculty member described the decision-making process as follows: 
And, you know, so it was kind of proposed as an idea, but it really wasn’t a 
proposal, it was this “Here you are.” So that immediately turned a lot of people off. 
I mean I was at that first meeting. And it was kind of like, “Well, so we are having 
it, right?” It really isn’t a discussion. And …then the discussion became for two 
years, “Well it’s going to happen.  If full-time faculty members do not participate, 
other people will be found.” In fact, the way I found—it was a done deal.  
The five colleges that spent less time engaging faculty members in the AH partnership process at 
the front end experienced a major “political loss” in their rush to adopt and implement the program. 
As one faculty interviewee at the most “top-down” college told us: 
Some people just hold on, they are just pissed off. They are not going to join [the honors 
program] until it’s independent of American Honors. . . . People say, ‘I’m just waiting for 
their money to dry up. And then we will have an honors program, and I’ll love to teach in it. 
One administrator, expressing regret over how the program was adopted, said, “I wish I could think 
of a way to reset the clock of how it was introduced; . . . some people’s pushback against American 
Honors is political.” Most colleges found it challenging to recover from the political loss; many 
experienced ongoing resistance (whether explicit or implicit) regarding AH-related activities and 
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initiatives although the resistance eased over time as some faculty members became more familiar 
with and invested in the program. 
Stakeholders’ Framing 
From the beginning of the partnership, faculty members had a variety of reservations about the QL 
partnership, including tensions arising from the cultural clash between the for-profit and non-profit 
sectors, concerns about exclusionary elitism, and AH’s initial emphasis on online and blended 
learning. In addition, college administrators expressed some frustration with issues of co-branding. 
While some of these concerns were ameliorated over time, others continued to linger. 
For-profit/non-profit culture clash. From the beginning QL’s “start-up” culture was 
unfamiliar and distasteful to many faculty members, who were accustomed to a more deliberative 
approach to decision-making and program-building. Within a short period of time, QL needed to 
hire and train advisors, instructional designers, and college liaisons, most of whom lacked 
experience with the community college sector. In order to move quickly enough, QL “operated 
faster than anyone else” in ways that appeared “disorganized and very frantic” to many 
stakeholders. High turnover among QL staff at the beginning of the process intensified anxiety 
among stakeholders.  
This cultural clash was exacerbated by faculty members’ skepticism regarding the profit-
making nature of QL. Some faculty members were concerned that QL would prioritize revenues 
above student welfare, and others were concerned about the implications of long-term partnership. 
One faculty member captured the anxiety expressed by many interviewees: 
I think the for-profit aspect of it turned a lot of people off. . . . I mean, one would like to 
think it doesn’t contaminate [the program], but it has to in the long haul. . . at some point 
  
11 
they need to see a return on their investment, or they’re going to withdraw their funding, and 
so how does that play into the local micro-level of an individual program? 
In order to better communicate with the faculty members, QL hired executives with strong 
experience in postsecondary education, who devoted considerable time to working with AH deans, 
directors, and faculty members on curricular issues and other academic affairs. As QL connected 
more directly with faculty members, they became more comfortable with the program. By the time 
of our campus visits in 2016, some faculty members articulated specific reservations about the 
program’s business model; but most believed that QL staff were genuinely passionate about the 
program’s mission of student success and had learned how to organize their work within the context 
of their respective campuses. Some colleges had also more deliberately integrated QL staff into 
their institutions, educating them about and involving them in their decision-making processes.  
Exclusionary elitism. At several colleges, faculty members believed the AH program to be 
unnecessarily exclusionary, for three reasons. First, most faculty members did not support the 
notion of a premium program fee. As one interviewee expressed: 
I have a fundamental disagreement with the idea that some people should pay more 
than other people are paying for the same degree. I know the argument is, there’s 
added value in all of that; I know that argument. It’s still problematic to me. And I 
know we have had students in the past in [our college] honors program who were 
phenomenal, who I know would not participate if they had to pay more.  
Second, some faculty members believed that establishing or expanding any honors 
program was out of line with the college’s open-access mission. At a college with a long-
established honors curriculum, one administrator recounted that: 
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Since we began the honors program, even before our partnership with American 
Honors, there have been people on campus, and there continue to be on campus, 
who feel it’s not democratic, that serving honors students is not necessarily part of 
our mission. They were there when there was no tuition differential, and it was just 
“should we have this elitist thing on campus?”. . . I don't know that there is anybody 
who has changed their minds because of the tuition differential and because of the 
presence of American Honors advisor on campus. I think the people who didn’t like 
honors as part of our mission before still don’t. I don't know that we have changed 
any minds. 
And third, in order to create a strong cohort-based model for AH, some colleges limited AH 
program enrollment to full-time students, which some faculty members felt was unfair to part-time 
students. Commenting on this policy, one faculty member said that part-time students  
. . . are working, they’re parents, sometimes single parents, sometimes they are 
working multiple jobs. Sometimes those are our most committed students. Why are 
we not allowing them to come through this program? . . . It would increase 
enrollment in the program, it would increase enrollment in classes, it’s not going to 
hurt us. 
Among interviewees who expressed their own concerns regarding elitism or exclusion or 
who relayed such concerns from the perspective of colleagues, such concerns seemed rooted in a 
philosophical opposition which was unlikely to soften or bend over time.  
Online and blended learning. QL had originally envisioned a model in which faculty 
members would be compensated for developing high-quality online honors course materials which 
could be deployed in blended or synchronous online settings; and then other colleges in the network 
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could quickly and easily adopt those honors courses on their own campus, using a common set of 
learning outcomes. Not only would this approach allow the honors program to scale up quickly 
across many colleges, it would also allow QL to develop and maintain admissions and articulation 
partnerships more easily with a wide range of selective colleges.  
From the outset, faculty members at each partnering college were strongly opposed to the 
notion of a common curriculum with common learning outcomes—particularly when that 
curriculum would be guided by a for-profit company that had no experience with community 
college students. Faculty members were primarily worried that academic quality and student 
learning would suffer; they were “concerned about another organization having the potential to 
influence instruction and curriculum,” as one instructor said. These concerns were layered with 
worries about intellectual property, frustration with the online platform’s technical performance, 
skepticism that honors pedagogy could be delivered through an online medium, and the belief that 
honors students would be uninterested in online courses. As one faculty member recalled: 
When [QL] presented themselves, they saw a vision of quality shared through a 
network, and I don't know, we just, the faculty [sic] here—most of us have Ph.D.s, 
and we like to design our own courses. . . . Out of all the value that we get from 
American Honors, turning our courses online was not one of them. That’s not what 
made me think joining that network would be good. 
Another faculty interviewee explained as follows: 
A lot of faculty [sic] were reluctant to just give up any kind of right they had to 
their course. . . . I think they just didn’t like the idea that it was suddenly not theirs 
anymore in some sense, or they didn’t have any say in what would be used. And I 
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know that initially, that was a big reason why a lot of people stayed away, at least 
here.  
In general, colleges experienced difficulties with recruiting faculty members to teach the 
online courses and in enticing students to enroll in them. Accordingly, four colleges quickly 
abandoned the synchronous online approach and taught most or all of their honors courses in a face-
to-face format. The fifth college had a general culture of offering hybrid-online courses and thus 
continued to offer several of its honors courses in that format. The sixth college had multiple 
campuses, many of which were quite small, and would have been unable to maintain separate AH 
programs at each campus; they thus continued to lean heavily on the synchronous online format in 
order to enroll students from multiple campuses in the same honors course section.  
Co-branding. Despite a generally positive relationship after the start-up phase, co-branding 
was an ongoing point of contention. College stakeholders characterized QL as aggressively 
promoting the American Honors brand in marketing and promotional materials, recruitment efforts, 
and student and campus events, at the expense of the college’s own brand. For example, at public-
facing events, “students that [sic] were chosen to talk about their experience . . . talked a lot about 
American Honors . . . [and] didn’t talk as much about [our college].” Over time, QL became more 
sensitive to colleges’ concerns about branding. As one college administrator recounted: 
When American Honors first came in here, they kind of wanted to brand themselves 
as American Honors. Their materials were branded as American Honors, and I 
would say to them, ‘Guys, the reason people are coming to school is to go to [our 
college], not to American Honors. 
On the other hand, if the AH program was expected to recruit a large volume of students for 
its partners, then it needed to assert a national brand identity that was not necessarily tied to each 
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college. On a local basis, this tension was resolved by co-branding materials as “American Honors 
at [Local College].” Even after QL reduced the emphasis on the AH brand, occasional tensions 
around the coordination of recruitment events and related branding resurfaced at some colleges.  
Failure of the Process Leading to Sustainability 
By the time of our campus visits in 2016, AH students and instructors were highly satisfied with the 
program’s academic quality, proactive and specialized transfer advising, and supportive community 
for its students (see Jaggars, Grant, Fay, & Farakish, 2017). However, as part of its initial “sales 
pitch,” QL had also promised two key outcomes: (1) increased enrollment, which would generate 
more revenue for the colleges, and (2) improved opportunities for students to transfer to highly-
selective destinations. In this section, we discuss the challenges colleges experienced in terms of 
meeting these desired outcomes.  
Increasing enrollment and revenue. In order for the AH program to increase colleges’ 
enrollment and revenue, the partners needed to first set an appropriate price-point for AH’s target 
audience of talented lower-income students.  Then QL would leverage its marketing and 
recruitment models—much more sophisticated models than the typical community college can 
afford—to bring in these students.  
In setting the price point for the program, QL understood that talented lower-income 
students might be willing to pay the community college a higher-than-usual price for a “premium” 
experience but that students might instead opt for a local four-year competitor if the price-point 
became too high. While the exact formula varied between its partnering colleges, based on the local 
economic context (including the prices of nearby less-selective four-year colleges), QL settled on a 
general approach in which a partner college would charge AH students approximately 150 percent 
of the community college’s regular tuition and fees; and the two partners would split the revenue, 
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such that each would receive about 75% of the per-student revenue the college normally earned. 
Given that each partner would be receiving less than a full-time student would typically pay, the 
viability of the business model was dependent on reducing program costs through economies of 
scale and also recruiting “net-new” students who would not otherwise attend the partnering 
community college. 
Some administrators found the additional program cost a recruitment challenge; one 
administrator in particular described the higher AH tuition as “a deterrent . . . . As soon as you tell a 
student or their family, there’s an additional fee . . ., it’s almost like done, end of discussion . . . no 
I’m not interested. So it’s really hard.” Despite the potential barrier of the differential tuition for 
some prospective students, the colleges and QL believed that by using recruitment tactics typically 
beyond the reach of community colleges—such as purchasing and leveraging high school 
graduates’ data from national standardized test providers or pursuing international student 
recruitment—QL could significantly increase colleges’ enrollment numbers. However, at each 
college, we heard that QL’s enrollment projections and goals were consistently not met, causing 
friction in the partnership.  
In particular, during our 2016 site visits, college administrators were frustrated that the 
proportion of net-new students in the program (i.e., students who would not have otherwise attended 
that community college) did not seem to be high. One administrator had hoped AH would “bring 
new people to the funnel, not cherry pick people out of a funnel, because we had already spent 
money, resources, to get them into the funnel. I was expecting [AH] to bring new people.” For 
incoming freshman students, it was impossible for the college to determine whether AH students 
were truly net-new, but administrators suspected that most would have come to the community 
college anyway. One clear recruitment option to gain net-new students was to pull them away from 
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a nearby four-year college, but administrators became skeptical about whether this was realistic. As 
one administrator said: “Oftentimes the kinds of students who we are targeting for American 
Honors are also being recruited to go . . . directly to the four-year institution and being offered quite 
significant scholarships to do so.”  
In addition, although AH had originally been designed with incoming freshman students in 
mind, it was open to continuing students who met certain academic criteria; and some 
administrators felt AH was too aggressive in recruiting these students into the program (and thus in 
reducing the college’s revenue from 100% to 75% for these students).  
In order to get a better sense of where AH students might have enrolled in the absence of the 
program, Table 1 shows National Student Clearinghouse enrollment data for students who were 
accepted to AH but opted out of the program. 
 
Table 1: Enrollment patterns among recent high school graduates and older students* accepted to 
American Honors (among those enrolled in any college during the target term) 
 Graduating High School  Older Student 
Enrolled in… 
Opted Out 
(N = 1,014) 
Entered AH 
(N = 904) 
 Opted Out 
(N = 1,052) 
Entered AH 
(N = 613) 
Four-year college 41%   1%    4%   1% 
Target community 
college** 
55% 99% 
 
94% 99% 
Other two-year college   4%   0%    2%   0% 
 
*Students accepted by American Honors who were matched with the NSC and who enrolled in any 
college during the term for which they applied to enter AH.  
**The “target community college” is the institution offering the American Honors program to 
which the student applied 
 
 
Among older students, who represented more than half of AH enrollees, 94% would likely 
have enrolled in the same community college in the absence of American Honors (and in fact, 
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almost all were already enrolled at that college prior to AH application). Among recent high school 
graduates who chose to enroll in AH, 55% would likely have enrolled in the same community 
college in the absence of AH, while most of the remainder would probably have enrolled in a four-
year college. Overall, across the 1,517 American Honors enrollees in this analysis, if one liberally 
assumes that American Honors swayed the enrollment decisions of 45% of those who recently 
graduated from high school and 6% of those who were older students, then AH may have swayed 
the enrollment decisions of up to 29% of its enrollees. If this estimate is correct, then QL fulfilled 
the colleges’ need to bring in at least 25% of its enrollees as “net-new” students. However, the 
estimate may be inflated. For example, students who “Opted Out” of AH may have received 
stronger four-year college financial aid offers than “Entered AH” students, and these differential 
financial aid offerings may have strongly influenced students’ final enrollment choices, independent 
of the existence of AH.  
From an economic perspective, administrators told us during the 2016 site visits that they 
seemed to be breaking even on their partnership with QL—which is far from the promise of sharply 
increased enrollment and revenue. As one administrator said: 
I’ll just speak direct; [QL] perhaps overpromised in terms of what they would be 
able to bring in, in terms of new students. . . . It’s great to get our existing students 
into American Honors if it enhances their experience. [But] we really want to see 
more students who are attracted to [our college] because of American Honors. 
Improving transfer opportunities. To create strong transfer opportunities for their students, 
QL had planned to create relationships with the admissions offices at some of the nation’s most 
selective universities, such that completion of the AH program might provide students with an 
advantage in admissions or allow for seamless transfer of credit. Initially community colleges were 
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particularly excited about this aspect of AH. As one interviewee said, “Relationships with schools 
across the country can bring opportunities to [our] students that they might not otherwise have 
thought of.” Each college knew it was unfeasible to secure individual articulation agreements with 
universities across the nation; and they believed, as one administrator put it, that articulation 
agreements “are not things that we as a college [can] manage.”  
QL invested a substantial amount of time and resources into its transfer network and signed 
more than 70 transfer agreements with four-year destinations, including some highly selective 
institutions. Most agreements specified that if the AH student met key criteria (for example, 
completed a certain number of honors credits, earned a specified GPA or above, and had no 
incidence of academic misconduct), then the student would qualify for admission; however, there 
was typically no guarantee of admission. QL also initially planned to create articulation agreements 
with its network of four-year colleges in order to ensure that students’ credits would seamlessly 
transfer; however, without a common AH curriculum, the articulation framework became more 
daunting. To ease students’ credit transfer in the short-term, QL worked to ensure that AH curricula 
were comprised of courses that would readily transfer to most four-year colleges. In addition, AH 
advisors worked closely with students on honors and non-honors course selection and registration 
in order to ensure that most or all courses would be transferrable to the student’s desired destination 
colleges. However, students would have no guarantee of seamless credit articulation. Thus, as one 
administrator explained, QL’s transfer relationships were not particularly beneficial for students: 
I don't think that the sort of formalized articulation agreements that American 
Honors set up for that were especially helpful. . .  I would say what American 
Honors did best was truly encouraging our students to apply to places that they 
otherwise would not have thought of. They really did push that. And we really did 
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have students getting into such a wide variety of schools, really great schools and 
much more so than in the past. What also happens, however, is that we had a lot of 
students, who are . . . middle class students, got into great schools and didn't get 
enough financial aid, so they still didn't go. 
From the perspective of the colleges, QL was supposed to improve transfer outcomes 
through its transfer agreements; instead, QL was primarily working to improve outcomes through 
the knowledge and efforts of its transfer advisors. For a college, this observation might raise the 
question of whether the partnership with QL would remain worthwhile if the college were to hire its 
own specialized advisor. 
Dissolving the Partnership 
In 2017 challenges meeting domestic student enrollment goals prompted QL to move more 
aggressively into the international student market to recruit AH students. In the following year the 
company launched a separate program called American Success, which focused on recruiting 
international students into community colleges to brush up their English-language or other 
academic skills before transferring to their desired four-year destination. While the international 
market was a good fit for two colleges, the remaining colleges either felt that moving into an 
international market was a mismatch with their locally focused mission or that they were unable to 
attract large numbers of international students due to their location. By spring 2018 QL was 
conducting conversations with each college to discuss ending the AH partnership for domestic U.S. 
students.  
When we conducted follow-up calls with a subset of key college administrators in early 
summer 2018, all said their colleges had benefited from the partnership with QL. As one 
interviewee said, “We wouldn’t have [established an honors program] without them. . . . I’m not 
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sure we would have . . . carved out the time and centrally now the resources—the money—to make 
it happen.” Now that an honors program infrastructure was in place, however, each college could 
sustain the domestic program on their own. Most planned to re-brand the honors program to be 
college-specific and to institute changes that would make the program more attractive to both 
instructors and students (such as reducing the level of differential tuition or allowing part-time 
students to enroll).  
In general, colleges were not sorry to leave the partnership; prior to QL’s outreach about the 
program’s dissolution, some colleges had already started internal discussions about not renewing 
their contracts, primarily due to the lack of net-new student enrollment. As one financial 
administrator said: 
When we first set this up, we did a model based upon the number of students we 
projected to have . . . however, there was a bit of cannibalism that went on because 
. . . [QL] took some of the existing students, and that clearly is not a good situation 
for us. 
Dissolving the QL partnership would also allow colleges to maintain the components of the AH 
model that they liked (“much of that is just good practice for honors programs,” as one AH 
administrator pointed out) while revising the components that they did not like.  
By the time of our follow-up calls with key stakeholders, they believed that “AH was 
critical” in helping them launch the honors program in the first place but that the partnership was no 
longer necessary unless the college had a particular interest in international recruitment. As one 
administrator said, “Having another organization on campus does cause issues . . . . In certain cases, 
it did not feel that we were on the same team, and that was the problem. So there are advantages of 
having it in-house.”  
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Discussion 
As more private entities attempt to provide academic services and programming through 
postsecondary institutions, based upon the findings of our study we suggest that colleges and 
universities need to evaluate these for-profit companies carefully and plan how to address the 
potential challenges and tensions that may arise. Such examination is particularly important when 
these partnerships are focused on curriculum and course development and involve faculty members.  
Amey et al.’s (2007) model of partnership suggested that if the framing and feedback 
process were shortchanged during the development phase, the partnership would encounter ongoing 
cultural issues which may ultimately make it unsustainable. At all six colleges the QL partnership 
initially struggled with a variety of cultural clashes and logistical challenges, which were magnified 
at those colleges that did not deeply include faculty members in the partnership decision-making 
processes. Gradually some of these challenges were mitigated as the partners created a closer and 
more trusting relationship—particularly after QL retreated from its original expectation that 
colleges would share courses with common learning outcomes via an online platform. By 2018 the 
set of re-interviewed stakeholders unanimously agreed they had benefited from the partnership with 
QL. 
Yet despite benefiting from the partnership, colleges were also happy to withdraw from it. In 
discussing the process leading to sustainability, Amey et al. stated that “how the institution and its 
members frame the partnership and how this changes as the partnership continues” was key to 
sustainability or the lack thereof, but they provided little detail regarding how this framing could be 
accomplished. Our analysis suggests that the willingness of the colleges to dissolve the partnership 
was due to the fact that administrators’ own framing of costs and benefits shifted over time. 
Administrators found that they were continuously expending time, energy, personal influence, and 
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other forms of social and political capital in order to defend and maintain the program. While they 
had expected the QL partnership to require some up-front political costs, they also expected these 
costs would lessen over time and eventually disappear as the benefits of the program became clearly 
apparent to all stakeholders. In return for champions’ initial investment of social and political 
capital, QL delivered on one key promise: It helped colleges quickly establish a high-quality 
academic program which was well-liked by students and provided a reputational benefit for the 
college. QL also partially delivered on its promise to create stronger admission and articulation 
relationships with a variety of four-year colleges.  However, its most important contribution was 
training and paying specialized transfer advisors, a tactic which most colleges could manage on 
their own. Most importantly, however, QL failed to fulfill a critical promise: providing substantial 
new revenue. Although colleges believed they broke even financially on the partnership, 
administrators also felt that breaking even was not worth the continuous effort required to maintain 
the program in the face of entrenched criticism. Instead, they preferred to dissolve the partnership, 
which would allow them to re-brand the program and continue it with modifications, such as 
reducing or eliminating the tuition premium, that were more politically acceptable to campus 
stakeholders.  
In short, Amey’s two-stage partnership model accurately characterized the development and 
dissolution of this particular partnership. However, our case study points to the importance of 
incorporating more detail into Amey’s model in terms of ongoing stakeholder management, as well 
as in terms of the ongoing process of re-weighing costs versus benefits. In particular, costs and 
benefits should be understood as not purely financial, but also as personal, interpersonal, and 
political.  
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In a follow-up to the 2007 paper describing the two-stage partnership model, Amey (2010) 
discussed the leadership competencies required to build and maintain cross-institutional 
partnerships, including communication, group facilitation, and organizational analysis. About the 
latter, Amey noted that leaders needed to have a deep understanding of the college, including “the 
kind of strategy that is most beneficial in the short and long run” (Amey, 2010, p. 18), in order to 
determine whether the potential benefits of a partnership will be worth its costs. Among the six 
colleges we studied, this element was not present: prior to being approached by QL, none of the 
colleges had a pre-existing strategic plan which called for the creation of a more robust Honors 
program. They did not explore a range of potential tactics or partners needed to create or expand an 
Honors program or conduct an analysis that pointed to a partnership with QL as the optimal tactic. 
When presented with an attractive and innovative opportunity, the colleges’ administrators allowed 
that opportunity to drive their vision, rather than first creating an institutional vision and then 
selecting the most appropriate ways to implement and support it. In the process they shortchanged 
the often-lengthy process of strategic planning and stakeholder engagement.  
If the colleges had first conducted a review of options for establishing and growing a high-
quality community college honors program with strong transfer outcomes, they might have 
identified other opportunities for partnership. For example, colleges which have committed to 
seeking strong improvement in student success have found it extremely useful to connect to other 
such colleges through state or national coalitions such as Achieving the Dream 
(https://www.achievingthedream.org), the University Innovation Alliance (http://www.theuia.org), 
the American Talent Initiative (https://americantalentinitiative.org), or statewide community college 
Success Centers (https://www.jff.org/what-we-do/impact-stories/student-success-center-network/) 
in order to share and scale best practices. For colleges interested in honors programs, one potential 
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partner could be the National Collegiate Honors Council (www.nchchonors.org), which provides 
consultations for honors program development, mentorship services for new community college 
honors directors, and networking and learning opportunities with fellow honors faculty members 
and directors. 
After such a review, colleges could still conclude that a for-profit partnership would be the 
most promising way to achieve their strategic goals. If so, then they might consider three 
recommendations we offer. First, institutions need to ensure that external entities have a deep 
understanding of the inner workings of their target colleges’ current academic and administrative 
processes. These companies should have senior executives with extensive work experience in the 
sector or an advisory board comprised of leaders, administrators, and faculty members from the 
sector. Second, while national for-profit companies are responsible to their investors, often over a 
relatively short term of time, community colleges are responsible for serving the needs and 
expectations of their local communities across the long term. With this in mind, faculty members 
are likely to question the motives of for-profit entities, to have concerns regarding additional costs 
to local students, and to worry about whether resources invested in the partnership will pay off over 
the long term. If the pace of a partnership’s creation and implementation is too quick, these 
concerns may not be properly resolved.  
Finally, to create positive and sustainable partnerships, institutions need to be inclusive and 
transparent and to fully involve the faculty members when evaluating academic partnerships. In our 
study, the college with the most inclusive approach identified a core group of faculty members who 
were interested in the initiative and worked on building buy-in and support through information 
sharing and ongoing dialog. Once the partnership was established, this college also created an 
implementation team that worked closely with QL so as to ensure clear lines of communication, 
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build mutual trust, and collaboratively address some of the unforeseen challenges the partners 
faced. The inclusive approach of this college decreased resistance, tension, and the energy required 
from champions to continuously defend the program.  
Conclusion 
For-profit companies have become quite interested in partnering with community colleges and four-
year institutions to provide services to their students. Yet such private-public partnerships fail as 
often as they succeed. This case study suggests some potential lessons for postsecondary 
institutions interested in establishing partnerships with private ventures. In particular, we 
recommend conducting a strategic review to determine whether the potential partnership is the most 
promising option for meeting the strategic goals of an institution and creating a comprehensive plan 
for campus stakeholder engagement and management. As part of both processes, administrators 
should assess the expected costs and benefits of the partnership – including their own personal, 
interpersonal, and political costs and benefits – and establish processes for reviewing the balance of 
costs and benefits as they change across time.   
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